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BOOK REVIEWS

DEFENDER. Edited by Donald
CITIZEN'S
THE OMBUDSMAN;
C. Rowat. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. Pp. 348, $8.25.
It is a truism that the legal process, as a part of the larger social
process, consists of a dynamic unfolding of claims and counterclaims
put forward by the various participants in consequence of changes in
events. These claims and counterclaims in turn evoke responses from
the relevant decision-makers, those who enjoy both formal authority
and sufficient effective control to make their decisions consequential.1
Today we are approaching more and more closely to the year
1984. Fortunately the forebodings with which Orwell looked to that
date do not appear to be materializing, at least in full. Nonetheless
there has been, especially since 1945, an unprecedented growth of
what some have termed the "welfare-warfare" state. Indeed, it was
President Eisenhower, that child of a more tranquil age, who in his
farewell address to the Nation warned us of the need for checking
and combatting the growing dominance of the "military-industrial
complex." (Perhaps he was not fully aware of its growth during his
own tenure of office.)
Lawyers, like others, have been confronted with new intellectual
tasks in consequence of these developments. It is no exaggeration to
say that the most baffling of these, with the exception of International Law, has been to cope with the change that has occurred in internal
public law as the old simplicities of nineteenth century parliamentary
government in Britain and Western Europe and of federalism and
the separation of powers in countries like the United States, have
given way to the burgeoning growth of the new field of Administrative Law. Stone 2 has reminded us that;

"[T]he basic historical context of the rise of the administrative arm is precisely the expansion of the range of
legal intervention in complex economically organized societies. To accomplish these new tasks for which the
capacity of legislative and judicial institutions fell short . . .
power was thrust into the administrator's hand. In this
context, then, the powers which fell to' administration must
be seen as residual, arising from the functional and institu1.
This view is expounded generally in
PUBLIC ORDER (1960).

McDougal and associates, STUDIES IN WORLD

2. The Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After (Fourth annual Walter
Perry Johnson Lecture on Law and Public Affairs, University of California, Berkeley,
April 11, 1964) 52 Calif. L. Rev. 513, 516 et 8eq.
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tional limitations

of traditional

legislative, judicial

and

executive organs....
It now seems clear that modern administrative power
... must be viewed as a distinct and largely new constellation
of functions .... [u]nless we see and treat administration as
a function distinct from the traditional executive, the task
of building rational safeguards against arbitrary use of its
power will remain mostly out of reach."
in many continental countries, the prime example being France,
the main safeguard hitherto relied upon has been the special system
of droit administratif, administered by distinctive administrative
courts and designed to protect the citizen against exces de pouvoir
and detournement de pouvoir. Though it is clear that these instrumentalities have undoubted value, and it would be presumptuous for
a common lawyer to undertake to criticize them, that they are not
without shortcomings is clearly pointed out by Judge Kurt Homgren
in the essay he contributes to the book under review.3
In Britain (and one may presume in other Commonwealth countries also) dissatisfaction has long been felt with the old, and partly
fictional, standbys of "parliamentary supremacy" and "ministrial
responsibility". This dissastisfaction centered on a focal point a little
over ten years ago when the notorious Crichel Down Affair (where
the obduracy of the administrative machine in mishandling the
affairs of a private citizen led to the resignation of the Minister of
Agriculture and Fisheries) 4 and since then there have been governmental5 as well as private6 investigations on what might be done to
ameliorate the situation.
In America, Professor K. C. Davis has summarized the protections against the improper use of governmental power as being
the provision of administrative personnel of high quality (he admits
this to being aspiration rather than fact), the development of procedural safeguards and the principle of check. It is certainly true that
judicial review of administrative action, where the latter transgresses the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
has been an important bulwark of individual liberty-whether we
are thinking of administrative attempts to censor books8 or to deny
passports." But Professor Davis is surely too optimistic when he
speaks generally of "the principle of check." Have we forgotten so
soon the revelations of Professor Bernard Schwartz, who, in the
3.

Holmgren,

The

Need

for an Ombudsman Too,

in

THE

OMBUDSMAN,

225,

227-8

(Rowat ed. 1965).
4. A good account is given in J.A.G. Griffith, Tha Crichel Down Affair, 18 Modern L.
Rev. 557 (1955).
5.

Report of the Franks Committee, Cmd.No. 218 (1957).

6. The "Justice" (British Section of the International Commission of Jurists) Whyatt
Report.
7.
8.

Davis, Ombudsmen in America, 109 PA. L. REV. 1057, 1061
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1962).

9.

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ; Aptheker et al v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.

500

(1963).

(1961).
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course of his official investigation some eight years ago discovered
some appalling malfeasances, not only on the part of federal administrators, but on the part of the very legislative and executive personnel who were expected to exercise supervision and checking?'0 The
enormous wealth of some of the private interests subject to administrative regulation in America and the consequent pressures they are
able to bring to bear on the administration should prompt us constantly to ask ourselves: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
This is not to deny that painstaking and laudable efforts have
been made in this country to see what may be done to improve the
workings of the federal bureaucracy. These range from the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, which reported
in 1941, to the establishment of an Administrative Conference of the
United States by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in 1961-1964.11
Nonetheless, the basic problems continue to confound us here as
in other countries. Perhaps it is this fact which has caused a new
interest in and increasing attention to be paid to the Scandinavian
institution of the Ombudsman 1 2 since about 1960.13 Hence the present
volume of essays,' 4 edited by Professor Donald C. Rowat of Carleton
University, Ottawa.
This is an excellent compilation, for it provides us not only with
comprehensive accounts of the history and present operation of the
institution in Scandinavia (and a few other countries which have
adopted it more recently), but also with cogently argued pleas for
and against its adoption in such countries as Britain, France, the
United States and Canada.
Professor Rowat's book consists of twenty-nine essays written by
contributors from thirteen different nations. Each of the writers is
an acknowledged authority in the field and writes with especial
competence of the running of affairs in his own country.
Part I of the book deals with existing Ombudsman systems. The
first four essays are, fittingly, by Swedish contributors, since Sweden
is the originator of the Ombudsman and it is only in that country that
the institution is more than fifty years old. Undoubtedly those who,
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, introduced the offices of Chancellor of Justice and Justitieombudsman in the course
of the jockeying for position between the King and the various Estates
in the Swedish monarchy would be astonished at the spectacle of an
Ombudsman now operating in the egalitarian democracy of New
10.

See generally, Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions (Knopf 1959). See also

It.

Administrative Conference Act, 78 Stat. 615, 5 U.S.C. 1045-1045C (1964) ; (The list

in re Applications of WKAT et al, 17 Pike Fischer Radio Regulation

1001 (1959).

Is recounted by David, Supra note 7, 1066-1070).
12.
Briefly, the Ombudsman is a public officer who enjoys entire independence. His duty

is to receive citizens' complaints, to exercise supervision over the entire range of administrative activity, to take corrective action against maladministration where possible, and to
issue public reports of his activities.
13. Geoffrey Marshall finds the recent Interest in Great Britain so intense that he
aptly dubs it "ombudsmania". The Ombudsman: Citizen's Defender (1965).

14.

The Ombudsmans; Citizen's Defender (1965)

(hereinafter cited as P.-).
I
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Zealand on the opposite side of the globe. Yet even a phenomenon
such as this is not without precedent in legal history. The late medieval Lord Chancellors of England, who evolved the use and the trust
might now be able to contemplate with satisfaction that this arrangement for the holding of property has not merely spread throughout
the common law world, but can be found in such civil law countries
as Mexico.
It should also be noted that a Swedish ordinance of as early as
1766 accorded to citizens a fundamental liberty which could scarcely
be more relevant today-and which contrasts favorably indeed with
American and British notions of "executive privilege" and "Crown
privilege". This provided that:
all documents from which government officials make
their decisions are public. They are available not only to
the parties concerned but also to any other citizen who
wishes to consult them. This privilege allows anyone to
check whether the administrative rulings have been made
on sufficient grounds."' 15
One facet of the Swedish Ombudsman's activity that should not
be overlooked is that he does not confine himself to the correction of
cases of maladministration. He also makes public his rejection of
unwarranted complaints, and thereby contributes to the strengthening of public confidence in the authorities. Since 1915, Sweden has
also had a Military Ombudsman with the duty of correcting abuses
of power on the part of the defense authorities towards private soldiers, officers and civilians.
Of the Scandinavian democracies, Finland is the one whose administrative supervisory institutions most closely resemble those of
Sweden. This is scarcely surprising when one remembers that the
two countries were under joint administration for many years prior to
1809, when Finland became an autonomous Duchy of the Russian
Empire. Mr. Kastari's essay shows how, during this latter period,
the position of the Finnish Chancellor of Justice (procurator) was
actually enhanced by the role he played as a focal point for Finnish
nationalism. Upon the break-up of the Czarist Empire, Finland obtained independence and in its constitution of 1919 followed Sweden
in establishing the office of Ombudsman side by side with that of
Chancellor of Justice.
The western part of the Scandinavian peninsula, Norway, presents a striking contrast in that no office of Ombudsman was established until very recently. A Military Ombudsman, described by
Arthur Ruud, was established in 1952, while an Ombudsman for
15.

P.23 (Bexellus' essay, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs).
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civil affairs, as Audvar Os shows, was not set up until 1962. In taking
this step Norway was influenced partly by Sweden but more so by
the Danish example.
Indeed, it appears that of all Nordic institutions of this type, it
has been that of Denmark (which was constitutionally provided for
in 1953) which has exerted most influence and aroused most interest
abroad. In part, this may be due to the brilliance, eloquence, and
prolific writing of its incumbent, Professor Stephan Hurwitz, who has
held the office continuously since the first election in 1955. But even
in the present book, the reader will find the Danish writer, Judge
(Miss) I. M. Pedersen, to be the most systematic, attractive and
convincing expounder of the constitutional position of the Ombudsman
in the countries where the institution now exists. Her analysis of its
jurisdiction and procedure, matters dealt with and remedies available, could scarcely be clearer or more enjoyable to read.
New Zealand has been the first, and thus far the only British
Parliamentary democracy to adopt an Ombudsman or "Parliamentary Commissioner." This was done by statute in 1962. It is perhaps
hardly surprising that this should have been the case. New Zealand,
like the Scandinavian countries, has a comparatively small and homogenous population and an institution which has worked well in the
latter might also be expected to do so in the former. The exigencies
of New Zealand's parliamentary system made it seem advisable to
enact certain modifications of the Ombudsman's powers and functions there. Professor J. F. Northey describes these very ably, after
first giving us a general description of the functioning of the New
Zealand Constitution. It is to be noted that most of the statutory
administrative tribunals, as well as local authorities, are excluded
from the New Zealand Ombudsman's jurisdiction.'8 Nonetheless,
and although some other adjustments were added to cater to the
sensitivity of cabinet ministers and members of parliament,'1 7 the
experience already had has demonstrated that the scheme can work
in a Commonwealth parliamentary system. Readers will share Professor Northey's hope that "if it [the Ombudsman] can succeed in
a relatively small common-law country, it may be capable of being
adapted to the needs of larger ones."' 8
Egon Lohse's essay on West Germany's Military Ombudsman, 9
which is modeled on the analogous Swedish institution, is of interest
in showing the ernestly democratic auspices under which the Bundeswehr has been set up. Almost simultaneously with German Re-armament the provision for the Military Ombudsman was inserted into
20
the constitution as an amendment in 1956. As Lohse points out,
16. P.135 (Northey's essay).
17. P.137 (Id.).
18. P.143 (Id.).
19. P. 119.
20. P. 119.
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there has been "a strengthening of parliamentary control in the
military field such as never existed before in German constitutional
history." It is interesting, too, that the German MO's duties include
not only the protection of the basic rights of the soldier but also "to
take care that the officers observe proper principles of leadership
and character guidance or moulding innere Fuhrung."21 In 1964 the
then MO, Vizeadmiral Heye, published what was undoubtedly an
exaggerated and ill-judged series of articles claiming that a trend
towards a "state without a state" was on foot in the Bundeswehr.
Shortly after this error of judgment he resigned, and more rational
counsels have prevailed since. As the Bundeswehr now occupies
training areas ranging from Crete to Portugal and from Britain to
Manitoba, it is possible to hope that its MO practices might perform
an important educational function amongst other peoples.
The second section of the book contains material on "related
institutions", these being the U. S. Army Inspector General, the
Philippine Presidental Complaints and Action Committee, and the
European Commission of Human Rights. The last of these is by far
the most important, hopeful and worthwhile of the three institutions and its growing acceptance among the states of Western Europe
augurs well both for developing European unity and for the promotion of fundamental freedoms in the region as a whole.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see why Professor Rowat
chose to include the material on the other two topics, save, perhaps,
as a cautionary tale.
The book's third and fourth sections deal with the possible introduction of the Ombudsman idea to other countries, most notably
the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. On the latter
country, an excellent essay is contributed by Professor Rowat himself2 2 and he points out that the need for a citizen's defender in Canada
is perhaps greater than that in the United Kingdom itself, in part
because of the antiquated laws on crown liability and in part because
"the federal divison of powers means that the provisions protecting
the citizen's rights against administrative action are worse in some
provinces than in others. ' 23 Professor Rowat is fully cognizant of the
additional complication created by Canada's federal system, which
would mean that there would have to be a separate Ombudsman for
each province as well as one for the national government. Indeed, he
goes further, and suggests that large cities, such as Montreal and
Toronto, should each have an Ombudsman of its own. The present reviewer has spent some happy years in Canada and has every reason to
be grateful for his treatment by its authorities and citizens alike; yet
he cannot refrain from alluding to one or two shocking pieces of
21.
22.

P.
P.

23.

Ibid.

121.
188 with Henry J. Llambias.
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maladministration that came to his attention during his sojourn there.
Thus he fervently shares Professor Rowat's hope that the scheme will
be tried in Canada, in the beginning perhaps on a small scale only.
As the author points out,
[O]ne of the great advantages of the federal system is that
an experiment with a new idea or institutional form can
be tried on a small scale in one of the states or provinces
first. If it is successful there, it will thus spread to the
others and can safely be adopted by the central government. 24
For France, Mine Nicole Questiaux, a member of the French
Council of State, contributes a stimulating essay 25 outlining the
French system of droit administratif and administrative courts
which, as she shows, is open to the lowliest citizen to secure redress
of grievances against maladministration by any person in official
authority, even the President of the Republic. This system is indeed
so highly developed that it has largely been adopted as a model for
the new courts that have been created to serve the various European
communities, such as the Common Market and the Coal and Steel
Community. Yet Mme. Questiaux does not succeed in convincing one
as she attempts to do, that an Ombudsman is for this reason rendered
entirely superfluous. As Miss Pedersen points out in reply,28 Denmark too has a system of droit administratif administered by its
courts and yet
the Ombudsman system offers other advantages than this.
It has created methods of dealing with the problem of control
that are usually not open to courts, ordinary or administrative.

.

. . [T]he fact that [the Danish Ombudsman's]

powers are different from those of the courts has made it
possible for him to supplement their influence upon administrative matters2 7.

For Britain, Geoffrey Marshall 2 and Louis Blom-Cooper 9 contribute essays favoring the introduction of the institution, the latter
rather more warmly than the former. The matter has now ceased to
be an academic one in that country, as the newly elected Labor
government is pledged to introduce a "Parliamentary Commissioner
for Aministration." A white Paper was in fact published in October,
1965,80 setting forth the role which the government envisages for the
Commissioner. Prima facie, at least, this does not appear to be an
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

P. 191. The same thought is, of course, valid for the United States.
Pp. 217 et seq.
Pp. 231 et seq.
P. 232 (Author's italics.).
P. 173.
P. 264.
Cmd, No. 2767.
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impressive one. The British Ombudsman will act only at the instance
of a Member of Parliament. While it is provided that he will cover
complaints over "the whole range of relationships between the private person and the central government"' he is to be excluded
from issues covered by tribunals, from actions of Departments in
personnel matters (including the Armed Forces), and from the entire
and large sphere of nationalized industry. Moreover, no provision is
made for his having access to secrets covered by Crown privilege,
nor can he take any action to rectify matters himself. All in all, thus,
he appears to be a rather emasculated version of his Scandinavian
counterparts. It is of course possible that his powers may be extended
in years to come, but the scheme presently envisaged lends support
32
to the strong and cogently argued essays by Professors Mitchell
33
and Abel that the institution is not at all suited to a country of
Britain's size, population, or constitution.
Finally, there is the United States. On the federal level, Congressman Reuss and Mr. Munsey34 contribute an essay in support
of the bill3 proposed by the former for the creation of an "Administrative Counsel of the Congress." The reviewer regrets that he
cannot share the Congressman's enthusiasm for this measure. The
Administrative Counsel, as here envisaged, is to be given "powers
of inquiry comparable to those of Congressional committees." 38
Not only is it difficult to imagine such a person (albeit assisted by
staff) coping with powerful bureaucracies such as the F.C.C. or the
C.A.B. (not to mention the even more powerful corporate interests
subject to their regulation), but the very fact that he will be acting
only at the instance of the Congress reminds us of the lamentable
discoveries made by Professor Schwartz concerning the "vigilance"
of congressional supervision. 37 It is, of course, by no means doubted
that Congressman Reuss makes the statement
in virtually all cases handled by Congressmen, they
attempt nothing more than to assure that the constituent
obtained his due, after full and fair consideration38
in all good faith.
But the present writer would strongly agree with Professor Abraham that 9
[Allthough there are considerable doubts that the Ombudsman is feasible at the national level in the United States, the
31.
32.

Id. p. 4.
P. 273.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

P. 281.
P. 194.
H.R.7593, Introduced July 16, 1963.
P. 196.
See Pp. 3-4, hereof supra.
P. 199.
P. 236.
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institution would appear to40be quite readily adaptable at
ment. It richly merits a try.
ALAN KARABUS*

LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION. By Joel B. Grossman, University of Wisconsin. New

York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965, Pp. 221, $6.75.
This is a tremendous study and analysis of the appointment
system in the federal judiciary. Every lawyer interested in court
improvement would find it very interesting, and most laymen would
find it equally informative. It deals not only with the process of
appointing federal judges, but also gives one a much better understanding of the history and development of the federal court
system, and the related political influences. The reader cannot help
but be impressed with the vast amount of research reported in this
book. My feeling was that the author had concentrated largely upon
an effort to present a review of the facts in as readable a manner
as possible, without attempting in any appreciable degree to influence
the reader toward any particular theory or program.
Some of the most interesting portions of the book are the numerous and intriguing incidents arising out of the many battles
fought on the appointment front. A central theme is the story of
the struggle by the ABA to make judicial appointments something
other than a political reward, and something more than political
bargaining material. By the time you have finished the book you
will realize sadly that we have made insufficient progress in that
direction.
More important, however, the book does prove that advances
have been made, and particularly since 1953 the ABA Committee on
Federal Judiciary has begun to assert an increasingly valuable role
in judicial selection. The Bar Association aim that appointments
should be made on merit irrespective of party affiliation has not
been accomplished, and more than 90 per cent of the appointments
are still determined by the politics of the party in power. But it
has become an accepted custom for the office of Attorney General
to confer with the ABA Committee before proceeding with the matter
of nominations. Regretably "the ABA Committee's success with
40. Much the same point is made by Mr. Ralph Nader. in advocating the introduction
of the Ombudsman in state governments. Compare the similar point made by Professor
Rowat regarding

Canada, p. 10, supra.

*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota; Advocate of South
African Bar (Cape Promice), B.A. University of Capetown, B.C.L. Oxford University,
L.L.B. University of Capetown, L.L.M. Yale University.
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the Attorney General has not been matched by the attainment of
similar influence, either with individual senators or with the Senate
Judiciary Committee." Most senators still firmly resent any interference by a Bar Association committee on the question of whether
the proposed judge is qualified for the position.
This very interesting recital of the unceasing efforts waged by
the ABA toward removing judicial appointments from the "spoils
system" is very encouraging and stimulating. Not all of the book
is complimentary to the American Bar Association, however. The
story of its vigorous campaign, many years ago, against means for
recall of undesirable judges can hardly stir our admiration.
In reading this work, one cannot help but be almost surprised
at some of the haphazard provisions in our federal judicial system.
For instance, Congress could vest selection of lower court judges
in the "head of a department," or perhaps even in the Chief Justice.
It is not even a legal requirement that the judges shall be lawyers
or that they shall be residents of the state or district in which
they serve. Prior to the Pierce Administration, the matter of
appointing federal judges was handled through the office of Secretary of State, and not through the office of Attorney General.
No doubt this work will convince the reader that at least a
great many of the impediments to judicial improvement are "built
into" our present system. For instance, the familiar situation is
recited, of a senator who confessed privately that unless he nominated his state party chairman for a judgeship, his chances of being
re-elected were nil.
Nevertheless, after reading the counter-play of numberless influences involved in our present system, the reader may well consider
whether the solution lies in permitting an ABA committee, without
sanction of any statute, to take over the function of recruiting and
obtaining the "best qualified judges and lawyers." Perhaps the
most valuable technique for improvement developed so far, is the
increasing demand that senatorial candidates pledge in advance not
to present any names for nomination until they have conferred with
an appropriate Bar Association committee.
Only incidentally does the recital touch upon the system of
life tenure itself, but it does quote the position of Lloyd Wright,
a former member of the committee and past president of the ABA:
"What the ABA ought to do is to exercise its great influence into
getting at the root of the evil, to-wit: The method of selection. I
have advocated, since 1958, that the ABA propose to Congress a
creature of its legislative powers comparable to what we call in
the profession The 'Missouri System'." It leads one to wonder why
a method which is considered a great improvement for state courts,
would not also be a great improvement in the federal system.
For those who desire further insight into the problem of judicial
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improvement, this rather short volume will be highly instructive,
and in addition, it gives encouragement to the belief that the long
battle to take the judiciary out of partisan politics, has made some
progress, and will continue to do so.
R. J.

OF MEN AND NOT OF LAW.

BLOEDAU*

By Lyman A. Garber. New York:

The Devin-Adair Company. 1966. Pp. 196. $3.95.

"OF MEN AND NOT OF LAW" AND
OF THEE AND NOT ME I SING
Mr. Garber has written a book:
Our judges deserve a close look,
With the American system in danger,
Can you think of anything stranger,
Than a constitution by its judges forsook?
They've departed from stare decisis,
Which I define to be timeless and priceless;
And have abandoned devision of power,
Freedom's long standing tri-partite tower.
I cite the decision on school integration,
As downright unequalled usurpation.
And I refer to Mapp v. Ohio,
An unwarranted encroachment, that cries so!
Why the threat of the Communist plot,
Our high courts have all but forgot;
Where we used to confine Reds to jail,
Now it's only their Constitutional rights we curtail.
And all of these judicial antics,
Are just so much confusing semantics;
It's simply for saving of face,
That our law has been staying apace.
Judicial Modernism the cause of the trouble,
So we'd better some old ism redouble;
Keep it simple's the thing,
Freedom's got a clear ring.
Let them do what the law commands,
*State's Attorney, Hettinger County, Mott, North Dakota.
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Exactly as I say it stands,
And from this line should they diverge,
Then we'll have one great impeachment and purge.
OF MEN AND NOT OF LAW is a first book by Lyman A. Garber,
whose credentials are those of "a Beverly Hills lawyer,"' which
purports to deal with basic constitutive arrangements of the
judicial process and with recent trends in judicial decisions affecting
those arrangements. Regardless of how profound this subject may
or may not be, all that Mr. Garber is prepared to offer regarding
it is a simplistic and hackneyed political tract, which in effect
propagandizes to a lay audience. As such it is difficult to justify
this book's review in a scholarly journal, except for the fact, that
the book is written by a lawyer. This fact raises the matter of
responsible policy promotion and study by those who assume the
role of legal expert.
There is, of course, nothing new in objecting to the use of
professional privileges as propaganda tools. Legal positivists (by
persuasion or in practice), as the dominant force in Anglo-American
legal thought, have been calling such thinly veiled value judgments
by their proper name and worse for most of this century.2 Many
a pained and bridled book review has been devoted to making this
excision. So emphatically has the point been made that few competent scholars acting as scholars have remained active in policy
arenas. Mr. Garber apparently is unaware of this tradition (he
makes no mention of the name or idea); clearly, he is not deterred
by it. Yet, why should he be? As it happens Mr. Garber is of
the opinion that "the American system has been, and is now, under
serious attack by Americans," 3 and that "many lawyers and
judges are now in the attackers' ranks-though the thrust of the
attack is toward the eventual destruction of this nation; a nation
conceived as one of law, not of men." 4 Mr. Garber belongs to a
second camp (is there a third, a fourth?):

On the opposite side of the semantics of modernity are
many lawyers and informed laymen who view the Common
Law as an invaluable tool of our civilization, and as valuable
today as it has proved to be throughout history. They hold
that one of the keys of American greatness has been its
government form-tripartite and decentralized.
They believe the near-miracles, accomplished under the
check-and-balance of the America of an earlier and simpler
day, can be repeated in coming decades on an even vaster
1. Garber, OF MAN AND NOT OF LAW, front inside fold of dust jacket (New York: The
Devin-Adair Co., 1966) hereinafter cited as Garber.
2. Arnold Brecht presents a conventional historical sketch of the doctrine's growth In
various fields in his work POLITICAL THEORY. Chapter VI, especially in point are pages
231-36

3.
4.

(1959).

Garber 1.
Garber 2.
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scale through the initiative of individual Americans. Their
simple wish for all Americans, yet unborn, is that they may
be free men and have the opportunity to lead meaningful
lives. They view usurpation in America-whether by national
government, an executive, a legislature, or a judiciary-as
not being modern, but as archaic as the devine right of

kings.5
Why, indeed, shouldn't Mr. Garber defend these legal arrangements
for the sake of "American greatness," "near-miracles," "free men,"
and "meaningful lives," as he perceives these arrangements and
values, not for the sake of these arrangements standing alone? It
is clear, too, that Mr. Garber makes no distinction between what
he regards as "an invaluable tool of our civilization" and the
"Common Law." "Usurpation" is, to him, not a technical departure
from certain rules, but "as archaic as the devine right of kings."
In short, Mr. Garber very much regards law as oriented toward
values.6 It would not be a sufficient answer to say to Mr. Garber's
fears, hopes, demands, and consequent actions regarding law that,
technically, they are not permitted. The question remains, however,
what values decided by whom under what conditions and how? Mr.
Garber would answer: "the law," pure and simple. This, however,
not only hides his value demands, by making "the law" synonymous
with those demands, it completely blocks inquiry oriented toward
his values or whatever values "the law" serves. It also short
changes study of the operations of legal institutions in order to
keep to "the law". If Mr. Garber means that law should not be
arbitrary, "Not of Men," then we may agree that criteria for responsible legal decision-making as well as responsible policy promotion must be specified.
Before attempting to indicate criteria for responsible policy
promotion, some of the notions protecting full assessment of that
responsibility need examination. Only a few will be mentioned here.
One is Holmes' guarantee that "the best test of truth is the power
'7
of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
Some others, quickly, are the popularized view of dialogue or "give
and take," the redeeming value of seemingly unconventional or
unwarranted ideas, some notion about "equal time" or reciprocity
of rights, and so forth. The point is to have something more than
the bare assertion of some right of free speech. AlL of these notions
may be put to the work of relaxing the instinct for rat smelling or
5. Garber 99.
6. Throughout this review extensive use is made of the value oriented approach to
law developed by Professors Lasswell and McDougal of Yale Law School. An introduction
to this theory of jurisprudence may be had from McDougal, The Comparative Study of
Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of World Order, 61 Yale
L.J. 915 (1952) ; Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional

Training in the Public Interest. 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943). More explicit attention to methodology is given in Laswell and Kaplan, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950).
7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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criticism in a derogatory sense. It is quite easily admitted, if simply
put, that free speech is a necessary condition of a free society
(even overlooking the truism); it is so for a purpose-ultimately
taking home a full market basket of human values (comprehensively
conceived). That the market is open is no excuse for peddling
trash there. Nor does such trash come to the market accurately
tagged as to its actual cost in human values. In the present instance
the layman is told that nothing less than "the American system"
is at stake. In short, it is not enough for the rash propagandist to
insist on his right or the other fellows reason to justify feeding
refuse to society.
A closer look at some of the conditions in the "market" is
more revealing. Competent legal scholars are not competing with
Mr. Garber to get the "opposite view" before a large, lay audience.
Mention has already been made of legal positivism (it has been
alive in lawyers too long to remain significant only as a philosophical difficulty) as a clog in the flow of scholarly policy communications into the "market." Nor do competent legal scholars often
or easily write panaceas either inside or outside of this legal prison
yard. Ad hoc rebuttals are not much more frequent. There are too
many factors militating against this, among others: compartmentalization of legal knowledge, technicalization of such knowledge, a
serious lack of the broadly based knowledge and skills necessary
to social and political inquiry, rising demands of excellence in
scholarly work, lack of the techniques and resources needed for
reaching large, lay audiences, concerns over reputation and image
(including concerns for conventions evaluating work and personality), career and study priorities and incentives, heavy and increasing work loads and commitments, and so forth.
Supposing, however, the willingness, skills, and resources to
engage in policy promotion, there are further difficulties. Access
to the most effective channels of communication may be limited
as in the instant case, for example, by the publisher's demand for
a "provocative book," 8 a "very timely expose,"
an "entirely
readable book," 10 or the like. One audience factor to be reckoned
with has already been mentioned, the skill level of a lay audience.
Audience pre-conditioning has to be met as well. Again, for example,
Mr. Garber's book will likely enjoy great success because it is
addressed to easily focused (and does focus) fears in our complex
and intense society (the lack of some plausible or expert overview
of that society is itself frustrating). His book will provide a simple
8. Garber, front inside fold of dust jacket.
9. Garber, back outside page of dust jacket. (quoted from Lloyd Wright's endorsement).
10. Garber, back outside page of dust jacket (quoted from Frank E. Holman's endorsement).
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solution (an "apprehensive set" in psychological value theory) 11
allowing the riddance of those fears, provided some action is taken
from time to time on the solution. (This would be the pure case.)
But competent scholars do not engage in such appeals, it is not the
heart or habit of on-going scholarship.
Holmes' market of thought metaphor suggests another snare
which very much needs avoiding, the idea that so long as the
majority becomes persuaded of the better view all will be well
with the world. But, there is no "majority" apart from some vote,
some decision, some action by a "majority" for the moment influenced by a "minority" whether on the board of "G.M.," or the
board of "P.T.A., P.S. 80," or in whatever context within the social
process. Nor should the "minority" be conceded to its own spokesman. What these members of society realize from society and
what society realizes both now and later from them is too important
for that. In short the market of thought metaphor repeated often
enough both obliterates the realities of its own operations and the
realizations of human values it operates to achieve. Political prescriptions at the hand or slight of hand of the legal expert are just
too important to be tossed off lightly.
The question of responsible scholarship in policy promotion and
inquiry can quickly grow immense. (Indeed, the truism is that
ultimately all knowledge is relevant to the evaluation of such comprehensive scholarship.) To cut the question down it must be seen
as performing a function (study and promotion) by a process (the
operations involved in such study and promotion) in respect to
certain questions (e.g., cure-all to slight and minute adjustment)
against inter-related, specified contexts within society toward clearly defined over-all social goals. This cuts the question into meaningful
and manageable parts, not to "essentials" or "simple facts." It
enables investigation instead of decreeing simplification. Without
attempting to be comprehensive or homogeneous, some significant
features touching on responsibility appear in the following list of
questions:
(1) what relevancy does study and promotion within the area
under consideration have in respect to present conditions within
the culture;
(2) what human goal values, comprehensively conceived, may
be affected and fostered by such study and promotion;
(3) what resources are available and what operations are called
for in such study and promotion (e.g., skills, techniques, procedures, approaches, methodology, time, talent, money, etc.);
11.

See the basic analytical model offered by Pepper in his work THE SOURCES OF VALUE,

Ch. 10 (1958).
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(4) what strategic privileges are enjoyed by the scholar which
specially commend his work to attention, respect and belief in his
intended audience;
(5) what strategies should be employed by the scholar in communicating with his audience;
(6) what specific prescriptions regarding the problems studied
should be recommended;
(7) what standards of performance are expected of the scholar
by his contemporaries, other experts in related fields, his audience
(it is to be noticed that a lay audience may have very vague but
exceedingly high expectations regarding scholarship standards);
(8) what commitment to the policies recommended under what
circumstances is being made by the scholar, and so forth.
While this list over-laps, it does place emphasis on some of the
important questions.
Mr. Garber's work is not addressed to these questions (it is to
be noted that no attempt to assign personal blame or imply personal
irresponsibility is being made here-the question is what objectively
is called for in policy promotion). In passing on Mr. Garber's efforts
the question of whether or not he has met the standards of performance expected of scholarly policy promotion (question No. 7,
above) need not be belabored. Taking the most narrow technical
view of these standards, Mr. Garber utterly fails the test. Stare
decisis is defined as "let the decision stand" without further technical
elaboration, 12 judicial concern with traditional notions of substantial
18
justice and fair play are said to be efforts to save "judicial face"
(the suggestion is that such traditional principles are unwarranted departures from "stare decisis" in the Garberian sense) as one of
the principal reasons behind "modern trends"; and something
14 and based on "semantics" '1 5
lumped together as "Modernism"'
(neither of which are defined-though the suggestion is clearly
emotive) is abroad in the nation and the courts causing "usurpation." Now, there are no insurmountable barriers to acquiring some
more informed view of judicial decision-making.
Incidentally, 16 Mr. Garber wants us to know that things have
gotten so out of hand that:
Americans have seen these words, "navigable waters," construed to justify Congress in taxing North Dakota farmers
to build flood control dams on dry creeks rising in the
mountains of Los Angeles County, and discharging into the
Pacific Ocean in Los Angeles County!"'
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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One might wonder whether or not dry rivers discharge, whether
taxes (I suppose income taxes-no case citation is given for the
assertion quoted) must be spent within a state only (how?) or
whether Mr. Garber has heard of the not-so-dry Red River.
The other listed questions touching on responsible policy promotion by scholars and experts will not be discussed here, except
to make brief mention of the first dealing with the need for an
assessment of the relevancy of given study and promotion. The
question is largely neglected as one of the pertinent tasks of responsible policy scholarship and promotion. (That it may seem allencompassing is aside from the importance of stressing it.) Unidentified threats ("the American system has been, and now is,
under serious attack"' 8 - from what?), impending total doom
("Is there danger to America and Americans from the trend to
abandon true constitutional government? Unquestionably the great
underlying principles of America's sovereignty have been attenuated
to a point of hazard. Let us not go to the point of no return."' 9),
sweeping accusations ("And to an alarming extent we observe lawyers espousing causes, and courts issuing decisions that display,
in common, an enchanted disregard of known human conduct. They
even display minimal regard for the security of the United
States.") 20, rash cure-alls are not necessarily the product of careful
identification of broad social conditions and trends or even of the
conditions and trends immediately pertinent to the problem under
consideration.
The point is let us have policy study and promotion by legal
scholars, but let it be objectively and broadly responsible.
DONALD P.
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